"50A. Genocide ..... 1091".

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, today we have taken the first step in completing action begun June 16, 1949, when President Harry Truman sent the Genocide Treaty to the Senate for ratification. For the next 36 years this illustrous body drug its feet on ratifying a treaty that would make it a crime under the laws of our country for a person or persons to engage in the planned, premeditated extermination of an entire ethnic, racial, or religious group.

Finally, on February 19, 1986, the vote for ratification of the Genocide Treaty was an overwhelming 82 to 11. But, our responsibility was not finished. The ratification has no meaning without the implementation legislation. Today, Mr. President, we begin that legislative process.

I support Senator BIDEN in the introduction of the genocide implementation legislation and will work in every way possible to see the completion of Senate action.

December 9 will mark the 39th anniversary of the unanimous U.N. General Assembly adoption of the Genocide Convention. December 11 will mark the anniversary of the United States signing. And, December 10 will be International Human Rights Day. It now appears that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will be meeting in December. I am pleased that the timely introduction of this bill may serve to galvanize us as a body into action that will affirm our abhorrence of human rights violations.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I am pleased to be an original cosponsor of the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987. This bill provides the means to carry out our decision to ratify the Genocide Convention.

The Genocide Convention was born out of a determination to prevent a repetition of the events of the Holocaust. After the war, the nations of the world banded together to define and deter the crime of genocide. On December 11, 1946, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution declaring genocide a crime under international law. Two years later, the General Assembly unanimously passed the Genocide Convention, and in 1949, President Truman submitted this treaty to the Congress for ratification.

In February of last year, we gave advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty by an overwhelming vote. But that vote alone is not enough.

In order to fully ratify the Genocide Convention, the Congress must pass implementing legislation. Until that point, we will only be on record as supporting the Genocide Convention, but we will not be a party to that all-important treaty; 96 nations have become parties to it.

Our closest allies—the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Israel, to name just a few—have ratified the Genocide Convention.

But we have not.

Mr. President, there is nothing complicated about this issue.

It is very simple and straightforward.

Genocide is perhaps the most terrible crime known to mankind, and we must enact this legislation to spell out the punishment for those found guilty of commiting this heinous crime.

It is time for us to act.

I hope the Senate will move expeditiously on this measure, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

By Mr. FOWLER:

S. 1852. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, and for other purposes; referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OVERSIGHT IMPROVEMENT ACT

● Mr. FOWLER. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act of 1987, legislation designed to both clarify and strengthen the role of Congress in overseeing intelligence operations.

Let me make it clear at the outset that this measure is not an attempt to "get the CIA" or to impede necessary intelligence operations. As a four-term, charter member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I believe that a strong and effective intelligence capability is absolutely essential to our national security. Indeed, my bill aims at enhancing America's intelligence programs by rebuilding congressional and public trust in the conduct of those activities. For the greatest threat to our intelligence community, and the thousands of dedicated men and women within it, has come not from abroad, nor even from critics here at home, but rather from those in positions of authority who sought to operate a separate and secret foreign policy through the intelligence agencies and in so doing have jeopardized the bipartisan, national consensus for improved intelligence capabilities.

This is a highly appropriate time to consider questions on the proper distribution of authority in the conduct and oversight of intelligence activities, appropriate not so much because of the recent revelations of questionable and possibly illegal policies, but because we are currently celebrating the two-hundredth anniversary of that greatest of all American inventions, the U.S. Constitution. That Constitution provides for a Nation of laws, not expedients. That Constitution sets forth a system of checks and balances, not lies and evasions. That Constitution promotes sometimes untidy rights and liberties, not perfect efficiency. That Constitution is a grant of limited power to the Government from the people, not of an unlimited license for the executive branch to do as it pleases.

I would like to describe the Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act by setting out first what the bill doesn't do, followed by a description of what it does provide.

The legislation I introduce today will have no effect on over 90 percent of all U.S. intelligence operations. Those programs which have clearly defined roles and which enjoy broad congressional support, including intelligence gathering and analysis, and counterespionage activities, are not covered by the bill.

Other intelligence programs which have similarly well-defined objectives and support but whose execution may involve greater risk, such as counterterrorism and antidrug trafficking efforts, would be affected only to a limited degree by the Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act. Essentially, my legislation would simply codify in statute what has been executive branch practice in these areas.

With regard to the one intelligence field expressly covered by my bill, there is no prohibition on covert operations. There have been in the past, and in the dangerous world we live in no doubt will be in the future, extraordinary circumstances in which covert action is the only effective means to protect vital interests of the United States. Thus, I do not seek to abolish the covert operation option, only to improve the process by which it is undertaken.

Finally, with regard to the constitutional questions of separation of powers and the President's role in conducting foreign policy, the bill would violate neither the letter nor the spirit of current arrangements. Indeed, it is an attempt to make the present system work better. There is nothing in my bill which gives to the Congress or takes away from the President the authority to initiate and conduct intelligence operations. Under my proposal, the President would continue to have prime responsibility for making these decisions. However, the same Constitution which makes the President Commander-in-Chief gives to the Congress the power to declare war as well as the power of the purse. My legislation is thus well within Constitutional norms in its efforts to clarify the congressional role in this critical area of national policy.

In brief, the Intelligence Oversight Activities Improvement Act which I introduce today would establish statutory standards in place of Executive order requirements, and an unambiguous prior reporting system in place of disputed legal mandates, for the one category of intelligence operations which has produced controversy and conflict vastly out of proportion to its role within our intelligence agencies: the category of covert operations, or special activities in the parlance of the intelligence community.

With an inherent danger of disclosure, with a mixed record of accom-

years from now this remnant of the river will flow undredged, unbarged, undamned and beyond what is there now, undeveloped.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, I join with my colleague, Senator EVANS, in introducing legislation which would designate approximately 57 miles of the Columbia River, known as Hanford Reach, as a study area for inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System.

The Hanford Reach is the last significant free-flowing stretch of the Columbia River. Originating below the Priest Rapids Dam, it flows through and borders the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Reservation, much of which has been closed to public access since 1942. This protective isolation has allowed the area to retain much of its presettlement character.

Most of the Columbia River has been drastically altered by damming. The Hanford Reach is the last area still providing a natural spawning and migration area for tens of thousands of fall chinook salmon. It is also utilized by migratory waterfowl as a staging and wintering area. Several candidate species for the endangered species list occur in the Hanford Reach area. Some of the few remaining archaelogical and historic sites in the basin exist along the reach. Many of these sites are sacred religious sites and burial grounds to native Americans.

The Hanford Reach has been previously threatened by water resources projects, including plans for hydropower development. Current plans call for establishment of a navigation channel. To protect its unique surroundings and status, the area is in need of immediate and permanent protection. The legislation being introduced today would designate the area for study, in anticipation of eventual inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System. I urge my colleagues to approve this bill and thereby provide the necessary protection for this unique area of the Columbia River

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By Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. PROXMIRE, and Mr. METZENBAUM):

S. 1851. A bill to implement the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

GENOCIDE CONVENTION IMPLEMENT ACT

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the "Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987." Enactment of this legislation is necessary for the United States to fulfill its international obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. This bill is identical to H.R. 807 which was introduced earlier this year by House Judiciary Committee Chairman PETER RODINO.

At the end of World War II, in response to the systematic killing of 6 million Jews by the Nazis, the United Nations drafted the "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." Article V of the convention requires the parties to enact legislation to give effect to its provisions and to provide penalties for persons found guilty of the enumerated crimes. Last year, after 37 years of debate and controversy, the Senate voted, 83 to 11, to approve ratification of the convention, subject to 8 provisions in the form of 2 reservations, five understandings and one declaration. The declaration provides that the President may not deposit the instrument of ratification until after the implementing language is enacted.

The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 would fulfill the U.S. obligation under article V. This bill provides protection to members of any national, ethnic, racial, or religious group by creating a new Federal crime of genocide or attempted genocide for any person who attempts to destroy such a group—in whole or in part—through murder, serious bodily injury, mental or physical torture, prevention of members of the group from having children or forcible removal of children from the control of any member of the group. Genocide or attempted genocide would be an offense punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or both; any offense that results in death would be punishable by imprisonment for life, a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or both. These provisions would be applicable to any national of the United States or to any offense committed within U.S. borders.

The United States has always been a leader in the international struggle for human rights. In 1948, President Truman reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to human rights by signing the Genocide Convention, and since that time, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan all have supported ratification. Enactment of this legislation—and the ratification of the Genocide Convention—would signal the U.S. Government's resolve to prevent future holocausts and to advance the cause of human rights throughout the world.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the RECORD at this time.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1851

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987".

SEC. 2. TITLE 18 AMENDMENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 50 the following:

"CHAPTER 50A—GENOCIDE

"Sec.
1091. Genocide.
1092. Definitions.

"§ 1091. Genocide

"(a) BASIC OFFENSE.—Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (d) of this section and with intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group—

"(1) kills a member of that group;

"(2) causes serious bodily injury to a member of that group;

"(3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of a member of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques;

"(4) subjects the groups to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group;

"(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or

"(6) transfers by force a child of the group to another group;

or attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

"(b) PUNISHMENT FOR BASIC OFFENSE.—The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) of this section is—

"(1) in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) that results in the death of any person, a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or imprisonment for life, or both; and

"(2) a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or imprisonment for twenty years, or both, in any other case.

"(c) INCITEMENT OFFENSE.—Whoever in a circumstance described in subsection (d) of this section directly and publicly incites another to violate subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"(d) REQUIRED CIRCUMSTANCE FOR OFFENSES.—The circumstance referred to in subsections (a) and (c) of this section is that—

"(1) the offense is committed within the United States; or

"(2) the alleged offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)).

"§ 1092. Definitions

"As used in this chapter—

"(1) the term 'child' means an individual who has not attained the age of eighteen years;

"(2) the term 'ethnic group' means a set of individuals whose identity as such as distinctive in terms of common cultural traditions or heritage;

"(3) the term 'incites' means urges another to engage imminently in conduct in circumstances under which there is a substantial likelihood of imminently causing such conduct;

"(4) the term 'national group' means a set of individuals whose identity is distinctive in terms of nationality or national origins;

"(5) the term 'racial group' means a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of physical characteristics or biological descent;

"(6) the term 'religious group' means a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common religious creed, beliefs, doctrines, practices, or rituals; and

"(7) the term 'substantial part' means a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part.".

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of chapters at the beginning of part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 50 the following new item:

plishment, and with their risk of long-term damage to the success of overt American foreign policy objectives, covert actions should not be routine. As a foreign policy tool that must necessarily remain shielded from our normal democratic processes and as a method which often has a low cost-benefit ratio, covert action ought to be a last resort. Furthermore, experience has shown that covert operations work best when they are consistent with our publicly avowed ideals and foreign policy. It would seem only logical that neither overt nor covert policy can be successful when they are at odds with each other, and since we are governed by a democratic system now 200 years old and our overt foreign policy must be the controlling force. I used nearly identical arguments in favor of legislation similar to the bill I am introducing today 4 years ago; disclosures of the past 12 months have only served to underscore their validity.

Specifically, my legislation would require that in order for a covert activity to be initiated, the President must make a written finding that such activity is:

Essential to the national defense or foreign policy of the United States;

Consistent with, and in support of, the publicly avowed foreign policy of the United States;

Likely to produce benefits that justify the risks of its disclosure to a foreign power;

Necessary because other alternatives could not achieve the intended objectives; and

Required by circumstances that dictate the use of extraordinary means.

In addition, the written findings would have to specify what government or private entity would be conducting the covert operation, and the authorized duration—not to exceed 1 year—of the operation.

Some would say these standards are nothing more than common sense; or that we shouldn't write such binding requirements into law; or that they are unnecessary because the executive branch is now using similar safeguards anyway. In response, it could be pointed out that had such a before-the-fact written finding been required in the case of the "arms to Iran for hostages" deal, the President and the country might well have been spared the enormous damage to his personal prestige and our nation's foreign policy interests in the Middle East.

However, I do not believe that we should make policy based solely on one case. I support those standards because I believe they should be the ones the President gets answered before committing us to a covert operation. A President, any President, should not be able to undertake one of these high-risk ventures simply because he finds it easier than working through normal channels. And the time to stop a questionable covert action is before it gets started, not after we have committed human and material resources, and our Government's stamp of approval to the project.

As to the question of the adequacy of existing executive branch standards, I applaud the more rigorous evaluation of covert operations being applied by Mr. Carlucci, but I would only point out what is done by Executive order can be undone in the same way. Executive orders governing intelligence can, and in the past have been, changed by each new administration. And by the time this legislation can be considered, enacted, and implemented the Reagan administration will be history. Just as we should not base our decisions on covert policy on a single incident, so we cannot pin all our hopes for improved decisionmaking in this area on a single administration or Executive order.

The requirements for a written finding, and for specific designations of who—what agency—will be conducting the covert operation and for what period of time, will serve to improve accountability both internally within the executive branch and between the executive branch and Congress.

In addition to establishing statutory standards to guide executive branch authorization of convert activities, the Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act defines and clarifies the Executive's reporting requirements to the Congress. In place of the current law provision calling on the Director of Central Intelligence to keep the House and Senate Intelligence Committees "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities" including covert operations, a requirement whose meaning has been repeatedly disputed over the years, my bill unequivocally requires prior notification of covert operations to the two committees. In place of current law's generall waiver of prior notice in extraordinary circumstances, my bill requires that such a waiver can only be granted "when time is of the essence," and furthermore, that the maximum delay in notification would be 48 hours.

Other reporting provisions allow the President to authorize certain covert activities by category rather than individual project; require the President to provide the two intelligence committees any additional information they might request about convert operations, and retain current law language for all intelligence activities other than covert operations.

Over the years, the Congress has been extremely reluctant to get too deeply involved in reviewing intelligence activities, in part because of deference to the President as the chief architect of our foreign policy, and in part because of uneasiness about potential security breaches if too many in the Congress knew too much about intelligence programs. On this latter point, I believe that the Congress has acted responsibly, by limiting reporting requirements from the intelligence community to the two intelligence committees, and by establishing stringent security requirements within the committees. The result, in the view of most impartial observers, has been that the Congress has performed better in maintaining secrecy than has the executive branch.

On the large question of the proper role for the Congress in reviewing covert activities, I would say that the very nature of these activities, which cannot be subjected to the crucible of full public scrutiny and debate, cries out for the active involvement of the people's branch of government, the Congress, in overseeing these activities. In fact, as every living former Director of Central Intelligence has testified, such outside scrutiny by the Congress has been valuable in sharpening the internal review process within the intelligence community and the executive branch when an outside party has oversight authority, those directly responsible for a given program are more likely to thoroughly analyze the advisability of the program than if they were not so accountable.

Other provisions of the Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act require the National Security Council [NSC] to supervise covert activities to insure that they remain consistent with the project as authorized by the President and reported to Congress; prohibit the NSC from exercising operational authority over covert operations; exempt wartime activities from the bill; and require all peacetime covert operations to be conducted in accordance with the bill.

The absence of clear and permanent standards to govern the conduct of covert activities and of a well-defined role for the Congress has been, in my opinion, detrimental to both our overt and covert foreign policies. Suspicions abroad and here at home about secret policies and hidden agendas have reduced confidence in our intelligence community, have lowered morale among our intelligence professionals, and have undermined our efforts to rebuild a strong national consensus in favor of necessary intelligence activities. One need look no further than the Iran/Contra fiasco to find evidence in support of these claims.

In introducing the Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act, I hope to advance the effort to establish an bipartisan, national agreement on the conduct of covert activities. Such a consensus would confer a number of important benefits. It would provide statutory guidelines to the Congress, the administration, and the intelligence community to govern covert actions and insure that those projects with high risks to our national interests are only undertaken when absolutely essential. It would improve public confidence, and the confidence of our allies, in American foreign policy. And in the long run, by imposing more exacting standards and by

improving outside oversight, it would mean better policy, both overt and covert.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUMMARY

Section 1 gives the short title of the bill, the "Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act."

Section 2 repeals Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which is the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment. This statute, which requires the President to make a finding that a "significant anticipated intelligence activity" ("other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence") "is important to the national security of the United States" before any funds can be expended for such activity, would be supplanted by the provisions of Section 3(b)(1) of the "Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act."

Section 3 amends Section 501 of the National Security Act, which is the section on congressional oversight of intelligence activities.

Subsection (a) tracks the language of Section 501(a)(1) of the National Security Act, except for striking the following: "if the President determines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, such notice shall be limited to the chairman and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate." This provision is incorporated into Section 3(b)(3) of the "Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act."

Subsection (b) establishes a new system for congressional oversight of covert actions (called "special activities" in the bill). It replaces Section 501(b) of the National Security Act which states, "The President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely fashion of intelligence operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for which prior notice was not given under subsection (a) and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice."

Paragraph (1) prohibits the initiation of any special activity "unless and until" the President has approved the activity and has made a written finding that:

"(A) such activity is essential to the national defense or the conduct of the foreign policy of the United States;

(B) such activity is consistent with, and in support of, the publicly avowed foreign policy of the United States;

(C) the anticipated benefits of such activity justify the foreseeable risks and likely consequences of its disclosure to a foreign power;

(D) overt or less sensitive alternatives would not be likely to achieve the intended objectives; and

(E) the circumstances require the use of extraordinary means."

The written finding must also designate what "department, agency, or entity of the United States, or the private entity acting on behalf of the United States" is to perform the special activity, and specify the authorized duration of the activity, which cannot exceed one year.

Paragraph (2) requires the President to submit, before a major special activity is commenced, a report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees containing the written finding required by Paragraph (1), and a description of the nature, scope, and specific objectives of the activity.

Paragraph (3) allows the President to limit the notice required by Paragraph (2) provided the President determines that it "is essential in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, and that time is of the essence in initiating the special activity." In each such case, notice would have to be given within 48 hours of the Presidential finding required by Paragraph (1) to: the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. In addition, the President would be required to provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice to the intelligence.

Paragraph (4) requires the President to provide any additional information that either intelligence committee might request about special activities reported under Paragraphs (2) and (3). Also, the National Security Council would be required to conduct ongoing supervision of each such activity and to ensure that it "remains consistent with the nature, scope, and objectives of the activity as authorized by the President."

Paragraph (5) allows the President to authorize special activities which do not or will not "involve elements of high risk, major resources, or serious political consequences" by category rather than individual project. The President is required to find "that activities falling within the category are important to the national security of the United States" and to report, before any activity within the category is commenced, to the intelligence committees, describing and justifying the category and activities within it.

Paragraph (6) requires the National Security Council to conduct ongoing supervision of each activity authorized by category under Paragraph (5) and to "ensure that each such activity remains consistent with the nature and scope of the category as authorized by the President."

Paragraph (7) requires the President to provide any additional information that either intelligence committee might request about the special activities authorized by category under Paragraph (5).

Paragraph (8) defines "special activity" in the same language used in the President's December 1, 1981 Executive Order on United States Intelligence Activities.

Paragraph (9) covers all intelligence activities abroad, other than "special activities" as defined by Paragraph (8) or "activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence." It requires that before a covered activity can be initiated, the President must find that the activity is "important to the national security of the United States," and report "in a timely fashion, a description of the nature and scope of the activity to the intelligence committees." The language in this Paragraph is drawn, in part, from the current Hughes-Ryan statute which would be repealed by Section 2 of the "Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act." It is an attempt to maintain current law authorization and reporting requirements for intelligence activities other than "special activities."

Paragraph (10) exempts war-time activities from the provisions of the bill.

Paragraph (11) prohibits the National Security Council from engaging in or carrying out "special activities except for the supervisory role provided for in Paragraphs (4) and (6).

[Sections 501(c),(d), and (e) of the National Security Act would not be changed by the "Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act."]

Section 4 prohibits funding for any "special activity" (as defined by Section 3(b)(8)) not conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the "Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act."●

By Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself and Mr. BRADLEY):

S. 1853. A bill to designate the facility of the U.S. Postal Service located at 850 Newark Turnpike in Kearny, NJ, as the "Dominick V. Daniels Postal Facility"; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

DOMINICK V. DANIELS POSTAL FACILITY

● Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to designate a postal service facility in Kearny, NJ, as the "Dominick V. Daniels Postal Facility," in memory of former Congressman Daniels, who died this July.

Congressman Daniels represented the 14th district of New Jersey for 18 years, from 1958 to 1976. Congressman Daniels made improved health and safety standards in the workplace his major concerns. He was successful in bringing compensation to injured workers and in creating Federal job-safety rules where States failed to provide any. Under his leadership, the principles of Federal supervision over occupational health and industrial safety were established. He was instrumental in the passage of key labor legislation, including the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act [CETA], and the Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA]. Congressman Daniels also was involved in efforts to see that schools and colleges strictly complied with the 1954 Supreme Court decision against racial segregation.

The voters in his district showed their appreciation by sending Congressman Daniels back to Congress every 2 years until his retirement. I hope that the Senate will act quickly to name the postal facility in Kearny for Dominick V. Daniels. This tribute is particularly fitting because Congressman Daniels was instrumental in the development of the Kearny facility.

A similar bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman FRANK GUARINI.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD the New York Times, obituary for Congressman Daniels and the text of the bill.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1853

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 850 Newark Turnpike in Kearny, New Jersey, is hereby designated as the "Dominick V. Daniels Postal Facility". Any reference to such facility in a law, rule, map,